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Foreword 
by James Libson, Executive Partner, Mishcon de Reya
 
With the depth of real-world divisions, and the power of the 
internet to amplify as well as anonymise, online hate speech is 
growing, with potentially profound consequences for victims  
and society at large. Tackling it raises not just practical issues,  
but fundamental questions about how much we are willing to 
police and curb freedom of speech, and whom we hold to  
account, in particular platforms - such as Twitter and Facebook - 
that host third-party content. The terms "hate crime" and "hate 
speech" are not even legally defined. Instead, what we have is a 
patchwork of offences, across multiple statutes, protecting certain 
characteristics (including race and religion) but not others, such as 
gender and age.
This report shines a spotlight on the nature and scale of online 
abuse, as well as the legal framework and ongoing initiatives to 
tackle it. A cornerstone of our work at Mishcon de Reya is to help 
our clients fight online abuse. We support the growing push in the 
UK and elsewhere, for much tougher internet regulation in order 
to address illegal content – including hate speech - and to shift 
responsibility onto Big Tech. We will be providing our views to the 
Law Commission's comprehensive review of hate crime legislation. 
However the law alone cannot solve this urgent, global problem. 
What we need is a multi-faceted approach, including better 
training for police officers and prosecutors, as well as more 
commitment to the powerful and promising use of counter-speech.  
 
Working with Professor Matthew Williams and his HateLab at 
Cardiff University, we seek not only to monitor online hate speech 
and its effects, but to collaborate on further research that - we 
hope - will form part of the solution.
 
“No one is born hating another person because of the colour of his 
skin, or his background, or his religion. People must learn to hate, and 
if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to love, for love comes 
more naturally to the human heart than its opposite.” 
Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 1994
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Executive Summary 
 — The reporting, recording and incidence of online hate speech 
has increased over the past two years.  
 — While the number of people personally targeted remains 
relatively low, large numbers of people are being exposed 
to online hate speech, potentially causing decreased life 
satisfaction. In particular, an increasingly large number of UK 
children (aged 12-15) report that they are exposed to hateful 
content online. 
 — Online hate speech tends to spike for 24-48 hours after key 
national or international events such as a terror attack, and 
then rapidly fall, although the baseline of online hate can 
remain elevated for several months. Where it reaches a certain 
level, online hate speech can translate into offline hate crime 
on the streets. 
 — Hate crime, including hate speech, is both hard to define 
and hard to prosecute. A patchwork of hate crime laws has 
developed over the last two decades, but there is concern the 
laws are not as effective as they could be, and may need to be 
streamlined and/or extended - for example to cover gender 
and age-related hate crime. The Law Commission is currently 
reviewing hate crime legislation, and has separately completed 
a preliminary review of the criminal law in relation to offensive 
and abusive online communications, concluding there was 
"considerable scope for reform".  
 — According to a recent survey by Demos, the public appreciates 
the difficult trade-off between tackling hate crime and 
protecting freedom of speech, with 32% in favour of a safety-
first approach, 23% in favour of protecting civil liberties, and 
42% not favouring either option. 
 — Hate speech often spreads via social media and other 
"intermediary" platforms, currently largely shielded from legal 
liability as "platforms not publishers". There is however a growing 
push for new and greater internet regulation, recently echoed 
by Facebook itself. The DCMS and Home Office in their April 
2019 draft White Paper on Online Harms proposed a new 
statutory duty of care for tech companies, to be overseen by 
an independent internet regulator with considerable powers, 
including to impose substantial fines. The European Commission 
is drawing up similar plans for a comprehensive "Digital Services 
Act" to tackle illegal online content, which may involve setting up 
a centralised EU regulator.  
 — We agree with the Government's stance in its Online Harms 
White Paper and would welcome a statutory duty of care, 
enforced by an independent regulator, to make companies take 
more responsibility for the safety of their users and deal with 
harm caused by content or activity on their services. 
 — In the meantime, counter-speech - any direct or general response 
to hate speech that seeks to undermine it - has been shown 
to be effective in the right circumstances and if delivered in the 
right way. Following terrorist events for example, tweets from 
verified media, the Government and police have been shown to 
gain significant traction, although counter-speech is less likely to 
be effective against fake or bot accounts, or those who hold the 
most extreme views. The effectiveness of counter-speech is being 
further tested and explored by HateLab at Cardiff University and 
other researchers across the globe.
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Introduction  
 
Online hate speech is now recognised as a pernicious social 
problem. According to Home Office data, 1,605 hate crimes 
were flagged as online offences between 2017 and 2018, a 40% 
increase on the previous year.1 This mirrors a rise in annual 
prosecutions for online hate, up by 13% to 435 in the year to 
April 2018.2 Both figures are likely significant underestimates, 
due to under-reporting by victims and substandard police 
recording practices.3
Research has also revealed patterns of hate speech, namely that 
hate crimes spike in the aftermath of certain 'trigger' events. 
In the UK, the Brexit vote in 2016, and a string of terrorist 
attacks the year after, prompted unprecedented increases in 
hate crime - both online and offline. Those intent on spreading 
hate have been emboldened and galvanised by international 
events, such as the election of Donald Trump and the rise of 
the far- and extreme-right in Europe and beyond. They have 
also been given a voice and reach by the internet which, as the 
All-Party Parliamentary Group on Hate Crime identified in its 
latest report, is a "key breeding ground" for radicalisation and 
grooming to extremist narratives.
The harms caused by online hate speech to victims and 
communities are not trivial, often matching those caused by 
physical crimes. Victims report feeling fear, anger, sadness, 
depression, and a newfound prejudice against the attacker’s 
group, as well as physical effects including behavioural changes 
and isolation. Research also shows that online hate speech is 
often a pre-cursor to, or an extension of, offline hate crime, 
which can multiply and intensify the effects.4
The Government has responded with several legislative and 
policy initiatives, including the National Online Hate Crime 
Hub in 2017 to coordinate hate crime reporting and, more 
recently, its draft Online Harms White Paper, which promises 
a new, independent regulator and a legal duty of care for tech 
companies. The EU has also proposed a tougher approach in the 
form of a comprehensive 'Digital Services Act' to be unveiled at 
the end of 2020, which will force tech giants to remove illegal 
content or face fines. 
At the same time, the debate around hate speech vs. free speech 
is far from settled. In a recent UK survey on opinions towards 
technology, 89% and 70% of respondents, respectively, identified 
extremist content and online abuse as key concerns.5 But, when 
asked whether they favoured protection against harmful content 
vs. protecting free speech, 32% picked the former and 23% the 
latter i.e. 42% did not favour either option, and were presumably 
conflicted. 6 
In light of these difficult trade-offs, and as internet platforms 
develop more proactive, technological solutions, counter-speech – 
which is any direct or general response to hate speech that seeks 
to undermine it – has been heralded as a promising tool. Through 
appeals to reason and by calling out prejudice, counter-speech  
can help to neutralise hate speech and, crucially, make it less 
socially acceptable. 
This report provides an overview of the latest evidence on online 
hate speech. Section One focuses on the many and challenging 
attempts to define hate speech, as well as observed patterns of 
hate speech and the impact on victims and communities. Section 
Two outlines the existing legislative checks on hate speech, both 
at home and abroad, including a series of case studies on how UK 
law has been applied. It also examines non-legal solutions, notably 
counter-speech. It concludes with our look to the future. 
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SECTION ONE 
THE PROBLEM OF ONLINE HATE
NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS NOW 
RECOGNISE ONLINE  
HATE SPEECH  
AS A PERNICIOUS  
SOCIAL PROBLEM.
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Definitions of Online Hate Speech 
The UK Crown Prosecution Service does not provide a specific 
definition of online hate speech, but they do state, when deciding 
on prosecution, regard must be given to whether the online 
speech was motivated by any form of discrimination or hostility 
against the victim's ethnic or national origin, gender, disability, 
age, religion or belief, sexual orientation or gender identity. The 
presence of any such motivation or hostility mean that it is more 
likely that prosecution is required. Beyond the UK, cultural and 
linguistic differences make a general legal definition of hate speech 
difficult to formulate. A focus on the expressive and emotional 
components of hate speech, as opposed to specific phrases and 
slurs, helps to deal with these differences. Legal academics have 
developed a set of expressive criteria, which if met, should qualify 
hate speech as criminal in their view.7
The speech in question should be criminal if it:
 
Deeply wounds those targeted
Causes gross offence to those that hear it, beyond those targeted
Has a degrading effect on social relationships within any one 
community 
Provokes a violent response
Other academic work stresses the targeted nature of hate speech, 
where the normatively irrelevant characteristics of individuals or 
groups single them out. Hate speech then stigmatises victims, who 
are regarded as ‘legitimate targets’ in the eyes of the perpetrator.8 
While these are academic definitions, international organisations 
and governments have made efforts to develop conventions and 
laws that embody similar criteria. 
Definitions of general hate speech have been developed by 
international organisations, including the Council of Europe. 
Recommendation (97)20 of the Council of Europe (1997) states 
“the term ‘hate speech’ shall be understood as covering all forms 
of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial 
hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based 
on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive 
nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility 
against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.”  
 
In the UK broadly speaking, for hate speech to be considered 
illegal it must be grossly offensive and/or inciting others to hate in a 
threatening or abusive way. Speech that is threatening or harassing is 
criminal regardless of hateful content.
However, merely offensive, controversial or distasteful hate speech 
is likely to fall under Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which protects freedom of speech that includes the 
freedom to offend others. In such cases, the hate speech is unlikely 
to reach the bar for a criminal offence, meaning the police and the 
courts won’t get involved, instead deferring to the website owner 
(see Section Two for a full overview of the law in the UK). 
Twitter and Facebook, as well as many other social media 
platforms, have recently developed working definitions of online 
hate speech, and have integrated them into their terms of use.
Twitter came under criticism for not taking a firm stance on 
hate speech, which prompted its CEO to introduce a raft of new 
measures. Twitter Rules and Policies (2019) now state : “You 
may not promote violence against or directly attack or threaten 
other people on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual 
orientation, gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, 
disability, or serious disease. We also do not allow accounts whose 
primary purpose is inciting harm towards others on the basis of 
these categories.” 
 
Examples of what we do not tolerate includes, but is not limited to 
behavior that harasses individuals or groups of people with:
violent threats
wishes for the physical harm, death, or disease of individuals or groups
references to mass murder, violent events, or specific means of 
violence in which/with which such groups have been the primary 
targets or victims
behavior that incites fear about a protected group
repeated and/or non-consensual slurs, epithets, racist and sexist 
tropes, or other content that dehumanises, degrades or reinforces 
negative stereotypes
 
Twitter also forbids the use of hateful imagery, such as symbols 
associated with hate groups, images depicting others as less 
than human or non-human, and moving images (e.g. gifs, video) 
containing any of the above.
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The full Twitter policy  
is available here.
The full Facebook policy  
is available here.
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Ahead of the publication of the Government White Paper on 
Online Harms (2019), the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee’s report ‘Disinformation and ‘fake news’’ (2019) 
concluded that Facebook and other companies continue to allow 
the publication of hate speech and propaganda and remain 
unable or unwilling to prevent these damaging communications. 
The second report of the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Communications (2019) noted that misuse of online personal 
data and hateful speech make the case for regulation compelling. 
Subsequently, the Online Harms White Paper outlined several 
recommendations for regulation.
 
Words that Wound: The Harms of Online Hate Speech 
When taking into account the ‘virtual’ nature of online 
interaction, where action can seem devoid of consequence due 
to anonymity and sometimes vast distances between speakers, 
it is not surprising to encounter claims that hate speech is a 
trivial issue. Indeed, some of those who support right-wing 
perspectives have argued that online hate speech is less serious 
than hate crime in the physical world. However, to make such a 
claim is to grant the would-be online offender the right to attack 
individuals on the basis that their actions do not harm the victim 
or themselves.
Research on offline hate speech has found that victims 
experience trauma in a pattern that is similar to the response 
of victims of physical crimes. The short- and long-term effects 
of hate speech are similar in form to the effects of burglary, 
domestic violence, assault and robbery. Words and phrases 
that target a person’s core identity can generate negative 
emotional, attitudinal and behavioural changes, all of which are 
exacerbated if the victim is already vulnerable (e.g. depression, 
anxiety, lack of support network) and if the context is conducive 
(e.g. culture of fear, repression or intimidation symptomatic of a 
pattern of similar behaviours).9 
 
Short-term impacts lasting a few days, can include feelings 
of shock, anger, isolation, resentment, embarrassment and 
shame. Long-term impacts, lasting months or years, can include 
low self-esteem, the development of a defensive attitude and 
prejudices against the hate speaker’s group, concealment of 
identity and heightened awareness of difference.10 Remembering 
hate speech attacks has also been associated with increases 
in self-rated stress levels, and increased levels of the stress 
hormone, cortisol in LGBT victims.11 
 
Direct online hate speech can be experienced by victims as an 
extension or a pre-cursor to hate crime in the offline world.12 
Facebook Community Standards (2019) state: “We define 
hate speech as a direct attack on people based on what we 
call protected characteristics – race, ethnicity, national origin, 
religious affiliation, sexual orientation, caste, sex, gender, gender 
identity and serious disease or disability. We also provide some 
protections for immigration status. We define “attack” as violent 
or dehumanising speech, statements of inferiority, or calls for 
exclusion or segregation.” 
 
Facebook separate levels of severity: 
Tier 1 hate speech is that which:
 — Is violent 
 — Is dehumanising and makes comparison to filth, bacteria, disease 
or faeces; to animals; to sub-humanity
 — Mocks the concept, events or victims of hate crimes 
Tier 2 hate speech is that which: 
 — Implies physical deficiencies related to hygiene or appearance
 — Implies the inferiority of a person's or a group's mental or 
moral deficiency 
 — Expresses contempt or disgust
 — Uses slurs directed at a person or group of people who share 
protected characteristics
Tier 3 hate speech is that which:
 — Calls to exclude or segregate a person or group of people who 
share protected characteristics that do not fall under general 
criticism of immigration policies and arguments for restricting 
those policies
 — Describes or negatively targets people with slurs, where slurs 
are defined as words commonly used as insulting labels for the 
above-listed characteristics
Shortly following the extreme right-wing terror attack in 
Christchurch, New Zealand, Facebook announced it would ban 
praise, support and representation of white nationalism and 
separatism on its platform.
These examples are provided here to demonstrate the recent 
moves made by social media companies to combat hate 
speech. Most other mainstream social media companies have 
rules similar to these that allow for non-criminal sanctions to 
be imposed, such as the removal of the hate speech, and the 
suspension and cancellation of user accounts. However, as these 
policies take force, some users migrate to fringe social media 
sites, such as Gab, Voat and 4chan, effectively displacing hate 
speech. Despite the introduction of ‘soft’ sanctions, several UK 
Government reports have actively criticised mainstream social 
media platforms for their lacklustre approach to hate speech. 
REGARD MUST BE GIVEN 
TO WHETHER THE ONLINE
SPEECH WAS MOTIVATED 
BY ANY FORM OF 
DISCRIMINATION 
THE PROBLEM OF ONLINE HATE
1918 HATRED BEHIND THE SCREENS
Hate crime is not always a discrete isolated event, and for 
some victims it is experienced as a process, involving a range 
of incidents over time, from hate speech online to hate speech 
offline, and possibly face-to-face threats and physical violence.13 
Hate crime can therefore be considered as re-engineered to 
function in the online environment, utilising new technologies 
such as social media. For some, this is the beginning of a longer 
process of victimisation that may migrate offline, while for 
others, it is an isolated event that remains online. But regardless 
of the form of victimisation, the emotional consequences of 
online hate speech are felt in the offline world by those targeted 
and the communities to which they belong. For some, hate 
speech perpetrated online has similar, if not more pronounced 
effects than hate crime offline.14 
 
‘The UK Safer Internet Centre (2016) survey of young people 
aged 13-18 (N=1,512) found that those encountering online hate 
reported feeling anger, sadness and shock and a majority (74%) 
stated it made them modify their online behaviour.15  
 
In a 2018 academic study, researchers found respondents most 
frequently exposed to online hate material in the US and Finland 
noted that they were less satisfied with their lives.’16
Reports from victims of homophobic online hate speech show 
evidence of shock, fear and anger; deterioration in mental and 
physical wellbeing; social isolation; fear for physical safety; 
heightened sense of threat; relationship breakdown; ripple effect 
on partners, families and friends; changes in behaviour in public; 
changes in use of social media; and periods of sick-leave.17 
Online hate speech has the potential to inflict more harm due to 
several unique factors associated with Internet communication. 
 
The perceived anonymity offered by the Internet means offenders 
are likely to produce more hate speech, the character of which 
is more serious, given increased disinhibition. The temporal and 
geographical reach of the Internet means hate has become a  
24/7 phenomenon.
For many, especially young people, communicating with others 
online is now a routine part of everyday life, and simply turning 
off the computer or mobile phone is not an option, even if they 
are being targeted with hate.18 Online hate speech then has the 
insidious power to enter the traditional safe haven of the home, 
generating a cycle of victimisation that is difficult to break.
When individuals claim they have been injured by hate speech, 
they are ascribing power to language that equals the force 
of some physical acts. Online hate speech is said to have an 
illocutionary force: an act of speaking or writing which has a 
tangible or real outcome.19 Examples of illocutionary speech 
include a priest stating “I now pronounce you husband and 
wife”, a police officer saying “You’re under arrest on suspicion 
of grievous bodily harm”, or a Judge saying “This court finds 
you guilty of murder”. These words have significant weight, and 
some forms of hate speech can carry similar power with deeply 
serious consequences: So called illocutionary force in hate speech 
is accomplished in 5 ways:
1. Through social media posts that invoke rule infraction (e.g. a 
tweet containing a picture of a gay couple kissing could motivate 
hate speech that draws on laws in a country that criminalises 
homosexual relations). 
2. Through social media posts that attempt to induce shame in 
the victim (e.g. the same tweet could motivate hate speech 
that uses the gaze of the victim's parents or grandparents as 
a vehicle for shame: “Imagine what your mother/grandmother 
would think if they saw this disgusting image!”). 
3. Through social media posts that attempt to induce fear in the 
victim (e.g. the use of threats, intimidation etc.). 
4. Through social media posts that attempt to dehumanise the 
victim. (e.g. comparing individuals or groups to insects, vermin, or 
primates). 
5. Through social media posts that attempt to spread 
misinformation related to the victim or the group they belong 
to (e.g. creating conspiracy theories or false information in 
relation to past events (such as the Holocaust) or religious 
holidays (such as Ramadan)). 
These five forms of hateful illocutionary online speech are more 
likely to have the desired negative consequences noted above, if 
the conditions of uptake, context and power are met: 
THE PROBLEM OF ONLINE HATE
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1. The uptake of the post by the victim. Only when the victim 
recognises they are being targeted because of their identity 
can they recognise the act as hate speech. There are situations 
where uptake fails, or the hate speech misfires. For example, the 
use of a slur that is not familiar to the victim due to cultural or 
temporal variation. In these circumstances, while the perpetrator 
of the hate speech may still be guilty of sending grossly offensive 
communications, the impact on the intended victim will be 
negligible, at least in the immediate term. 
2. The context of the hate speech is conducive. When a victim is 
aware that they are interacting in a culture of fear, intimidation and 
repression where personal characteristics are routinely targeted 
and there are no laws protecting them, the pains of hate speech 
are amplified.  
3. The power of the perpetrator outweighs that of the victim. 
When the hate speech offender is perceived by the victim to 
hold more power, whether that be offline or online status, they 
are more likely to feel subordinated. Due to the additional level 
of vulnerability brought about by this power difference, the victim 
is likely to feel the pains of hate speech more. This is certainly the 
case with humiliation, that occurs within relationships of unequal 
status where the humiliator dominates the victim and undermines 
their sense of identity.20 
The effects of hate speech on the wider community are also 
documented. Those who witness hate speech or hear of it second-
hand, while escaping the direct harm caused, do not escape its 
more general consequences. When members of minority groups 
hear of a spate of hate crimes online or in their village, town or 
city, their levels of stress and fear increase, resulting in behaviour 
changes, including avoiding leaving the home. Some non-victims 
report becoming prisoners in their own homes simply because of 
what they read online about hostility directed towards members of 
their community.21 An abundance of hate speech can also impact 
on the behaviours of other would-be offenders. A cascade effect 
has been reported where online hate speech reaches a critical 
mass around a particular event. The results are not only found 
online. Social media posts containing anti-refugee and anti-Muslim 
content have been found to correlate with hate crimes on the 
streets in Germany, the US and the UK.22  
 
The UK based study, conducted by HateLab, found a consistent 
positive association between Twitter hate speech targeting race and 
religion and racially and religiously aggravated offences on the streets 
in London. The study concludes online hate victimization is part of 
a wider process of harm that can begin on social media and then 
migrate to the physical world. 
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Online race hate crime makes up the majority of all online hate offences 
However, transgender individuals are most likely to be victimised online: 
6% 4% 3% 2%
of all 
transgender 
based hate 
crime is 
committed 
online, 
compared to 
for disability 
and sexual 
orientation 
based hate 
crime, 
of religious 
based hate 
crime and
of race based 
hate crime. 
Patterns of Online Hate Speech Victimisation
Home Office analysis of all hate crimes reported to the police 
shows that 1,605 (2%) were flagged as online offences between 
2017-18, an increase on the 1,148 in the previous year. 
Online
hate
offences
Race hate crime
52%
Sexual orientation 20%
Disability 13%
Religion 12%
Transgender 4%
Crown Prosecutions Statistics show that in the year April 2017 
to 2018 there were 435 offences related to online hate under 
section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 and section 1 of 
the Malicious Communications Act 1998, an increase on the 386 
recorded in the previous year.23
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Official figures should be treated with a degree of caution, due 
to significant underreporting of hate and online offences, and 
widespread poor practice in police recording. Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Service 2018 
report ‘Understanding the Difference: The Initial Police Response 
to Hate Crime’ found that forces across the country have been slow 
to understand the changing nature of hate crime, and to take online 
offending more seriously. Despite the Home Office introducing 
a requirement for police forces to flag cyber-enabled hate crime 
offences, uptake of this practice has been patchy and inconsistent, 
resulting in unreliable data on this type of offence.25 
Charities that support victims of hate crime also collate data 
on online hate speech. While these data do not reflect accurate 
information on actual numbers of criminal hate offences, they do 
allow us to get a sense of hate speech trends over time.  
 
In the first six months of 2019, Community Security Trust, a charity 
that supports the Jewish community, recorded 323 online anti-
Semitic UK based incidents, representing 36% of all incidents. This 
represents an increase of 46% on the same period the year before.26 
In the first six months of 2018, Tell MAMA, a charity providing 
support to victims of anti-Muslim hate crime, recorded 207 UK 
based incidents of Islamophobic online hate speech, representing 
34% of all reports. The previous year online Islamophobic hate 
speech represented 30% of all recorded incidents.27
Stonewall, a charity that supports lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender people in the UK, found in its 2017 survey that 10% of 
respondents had suffered direct online hate abuse. This represents 
an increase of 5% from the 2013 survey. Disaggregated figures 
for 2017 show online victimisation was significantly higher for 
respondents who identified as transgender (26%), non-binary 
LGBT (26%), young LGBT (23%) and black, Asian and minority 
ethnic LGBT (20%). Witnessing online LGBT hate material aimed 
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Analysis of police crime data obtained from freedom of information 
requests shows that online hate crimes targeting people with 
disabilities increased by 304% between 2015 and 2017. 
This represents the highest increase across all protected 
characteristics, including religion (240%), sexual orientation (208%), 
race (184%) and transgender identity (88%). 24
304%
at others varied by age and ethnicity. Overall, 45% of respondents 
had seen such material, with the number rising to 72% for young 
LGBT and 66% for black, Asian and minority ethnic LGBT 
respondents. In 2013, 28% of LGBT respondents had encountered 
online hate material.28 The Galop 2016 LGBT+ Hate Crime 
Survey found that 30% of respondents had reported experiencing 
online LGBT+ hate crime. 
Recent academic research that examined hate speech on social 
media found high rates of exposure in four countries.29 A large 
representative survey (N=3,565) covering 15-30 year-olds in 
the US, UK, Germany and Finland found on average 43% of 
respondents had encountered hate material online. This rose 
to 53% for the US, while 39% of UK respondents reported 
encountering such material. Most hate material was encountered 
on social media, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, and 
websites dedicated to self-harm. These conclusions are supported 
by anecdotal experience of our own Mishcon de Reya Cyber 
investigations into social media issues, where it is often difficult to 
avoid potentially hateful material.  
 
The number of survey respondents being personally targeted by 
hate material was much lower, at around 11%. Although it must 
be noted that the sample did not specifically target those with 
protected characteristics.  
US (16%),
UK (12%)
Finland (10%)
Germany (4%)30
Rates were highest in the
Similarly, rates of sending hate material were low in the sample. Those 
in the US were most likely to admit to this act (4%), followed by 
respondents in Finland (4%), the UK (3%) and Germany (1%). Young 
men living alone with a close connection to the online world were 
most likely to post hate material.31  
 
A 2016 survey of young people aged 13-18 (N=1,512) in the 
UK found that 82% of respondents had encountered online 
hate speech, the majority of which was based on race, religion 
or sexual orientation. Around a quarter (24%) stated that they 
had personally experienced hate because of their protected 
characteristic (including gender).32
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‘TRIGGER’ EVENTS
MOTIVATE THE 
PRODUCTION AND 
SPREAD OF HATE BOTH 
ON AND OFFLINE.
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In 2019 Ofcom published the “Adults’ Media Use and Attitudes 
Report” which found that 53% of internet users reported seeing 
hateful content online in 2018, an increase from 47% in 2017. Those 
aged 16-34 were most likely to report seeing this content (71% 
for 16-24s and 63% for 25-34s). Only 41% of those who witnessed 
online hate took action in relation to the most recent incident, 
and older respondents (55+) were less likely to act compared to 
younger respondents.
In February of 2019 Ofcom published their annual report 
“Children and parents: media use and attitudes.” Since 2016 
the report has asked 12-15 year-olds in the UK the following 
question: “In the past year, have you seen anything hateful on the 
internet that has been directed at a particular group of people, 
based on, for instance, their gender, religion, disability, sexuality 
or gender identity? Examples of these sorts of things might be 
nasty or hateful comments or images that have been posted on 
social media, comments in response to an article that you read 
online, or videos posted on sites like YouTube.” Despite almost 
all respondents stating they had been told how to use the Internet 
safely, 45% of 12-15 year olds in 2018 reported encountering 
hateful content online, unchanged from the 2017 figure. 
However, in 2016 the figure was 34%. Of those that encountered 
this content, 42% took action, including reporting the post to the 
website and commenting on its inappropriateness. 
Trigger Events and Online Hate Speech
The sustained increase in exposure to online hate content 
recorded in the Ofcom research in 2017 and 2018 may be a 
reflection of the number of ‘trigger’ events that occurred over 
the previous two years. ‘Trigger’ events are incidents that 
motivate the production and spread of hate both on and offline. 
Research has shown that hate crime and speech tend to increase 
dramatically in the aftermath of certain antecedent events, such 
as terror attacks and controversial political votes. Before and 
while the Ofcom survey was in the field (April-June 2017 and 
2018) the Brexit vote and result occurred and the UK suffered 
three major terror attacks. All of these events culminated in an 
unprecedented rise in hate crime as recorded by the police.
 
Following trigger events, it is often social media users who are 
first to publish a reaction.33 Figure 1 shows the Twitter reaction 
to the murder of Lee Rigby in Woolwich, 2013. The maps of 
the UK and London show the location of tweets about the 
attack, with clusters appearing in Manchester (the family home 
of Rigby) the Midlands, South Wales and the West, the East, 
and Woolwich. The textual content of tweets is presented in the 
wordcloud, a representation of the most frequent words used 
across all tweets posted.  
 
Figure 1: UK Twitter reaction to the Woolwich terror attack in 2013
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Figure 2: UK anti-Muslim hate speech on Twitter following the Woolwich terror attack in 2013
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THE PROBLEM OF ONLINE HATE
Figure 2 shows the frequency of moderate and extreme anti-
Muslim online hate speech produced on Twitter in the aftermath 
of the attack. Moderate hate speech included posts that were likely 
to cause offense, such as “Told you we shouldn’t have let them 
Muslims in. Send them home! #BurntheQuran”. Extreme hate 
speech included similar content, but also degrading racial slurs and 
expletives. Both forms of online hate speech peaked the day of the 
attack and then rapidly declined within the first 48 hours of the 
aftermath. This indicates a ‘half-life’ of online hate.34 
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Figure 3: UK anti-Muslim hate speech on Twitter around the Brexit vote
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This ‘half-life’ is also found in relation to anti-Muslim online 
hate speech produced and shared following the Brexit vote in 
June 2016 (Figure 3) and anti-Semitic hate speech produced and 
spread following the breaking of the Ken Livingstone story the 
same year (Figure 4). In both cases hate speech spikes on or just 
following the date of the incident and then sharply declines. In 
the case of terror attacks, the rapid escalation and decay in the 
frequency of hate speech posts has been explained by the capacity 
of ‘trigger’ events to temporarily reduce the tendency of some 
users to control or regulate their implicit prejudices held towards 
individuals who share similar characteristics to the perpetrators. 
The posting of hate is further encouraged by others who post 
similar messages (a cascade effect) and the perception that such 
actions have little or no personal consequence.35 Following a 
frisson of hateful sentiment in the first 24-48 hours, in the days 
and weeks after the ‘trigger’ event, users begin to regulate their 
implicit prejudices, and the posting of hate reduces.36 However, 
what is observable in the weeks and months following these 
incidents is that hate speech production and propagation remains 
higher on average than in the proceeding period. This has led 
some to conclude that we are living with a new baseline of hate 
speech online.  
 
Figure 4: UK anti-Semitic hate speech on Twitter around the Ken Livingstone story breaking in 2016
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Figure 5: Global anti-Muslim hate speech on Twitter during 2017  
(gaps relate to breaks in data collection)
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Figure 5 shows anti-Muslim hate speech posted globally on 
Twitter throughout 2017.37 Discernible spikes in hate speech are 
evident that coincide with key events during the year, notably the 
UK terror attacks in Westminster, Manchester, London Bridge and 
Finsbury Park.38 The large spike in October is related to the mass 
shooting in Las Vegas, US, where for a period of time assumptions 
were being made on Twitter that the attack was an extremist 
Islamic terrorist incident, fuelled in part by a false claim by ISIS 
that the shooter was acting on their behalf. 
In the events presented here, statistical models showed that those 
identifying with far and extreme right-wing groups were most likely 
to produce hateful content on Twitter. While not all hate speech 
reached the criminal threshold set out by the Crown Prosecution 
Service, some of it is was deemed sufficiently offensive to warrant 
requests to social media providers to delete content and user 
accounts for infringing platform rules.
Statistical modelling also showed that across all events, compared 
to all other types of online content, hate speech was least likely 
to be retweeted in volume and to survive for long periods of time, 
supporting the ‘half-life’ hypothesis. Where hate speech is re-
tweeted following an event, there is evidence to show this activity 
emanates from a core group of like-minded individuals who seek 
out each other’s messages. These Twitter users act like an ‘echo 
chamber’, where grossly offensive hateful messages reverberate 
around members, but rarely spread widely beyond them.39 Hate 
speech produced around the Brexit vote in particular was found to 
be largely driven by a small number of Twitter accounts. Around 
50% of anti-Muslim hate speech was produced by only 6% of 
users, many of whom were classified as politically anti-Islam.40
Tweets from verified, media, government and police accounts 
gained significant traction during and in the aftermath of 
terrorist events.41 As these tweeters are least likely to produce 
and propagate hate speech, and are more likely to engage in the 
spread of positive messages following ‘trigger’ events, they proved 
to be effective vehicles for stemming negative content through 
the production of counter-speech. In particular, the dominance of 
traditional media outlets on Twitter, such as broadsheet and TV 
news, leads to the conclusion that these channels still represent a 
valuable pipeline for calls to reason and calm following possibly 
fractious events of national interest (see end of this section for a 
further discussion of counter-speech).
Bots and fake accounts
In October 2018 Twitter published over 10 million tweets from 
around 4,600 Russian and Iranian-linked fake/bot accounts. Bots 
are automated accounts that are programmed to retweet and post 
content for various reasons. Fake accounts are semi-automated, 
meaning they are routinely controlled by a human or group of 
humans, allowing for more complex interaction with other users, 
and for more nuanced messages in reaction to unfolding events. 
While not all bots and fake accounts are problematic (some 
retweet and post useful content) many have been created for more 
subversive reasons, such as influencing voter choice in the run up 
to elections, and spreading divisive content following national 
events. 
Bots can sometimes be detected by their characteristics that 
distinguish them from human users. These characteristics include a 
high frequency of retweets/tweets (e.g. over 50 a day), activity at 
regular intervals (e.g. every five minutes), content that contains mainly 
retweets, the ratio of activity from a mobile device versus a desktop 
device, accounts that follow many users, but have a low number 
of followers, and partial or unpopulated user details (e.g. photo, 
profile description, location etc.). Fake accounts are harder to detect, 
given they are semi-controlled by humans, but telltale signs include 
accounts less than 6 months old, and profile photos that can be found 
elsewhere on the internet that clearly do not belong to the account.
THE PROBLEM OF ONLINE HATE
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Research at Cardiff University showed that fake Twitter accounts 
purportedly sponsored by overseas state actors spread fake news 
and promoted xenophobic messages following the 2017 terror 
attacks in the UK, that had the potential consequence of raising 
tensions between groups. Following the Manchester and London 
Bridge terror attacks, a fake account assumed to be linked to 
Russia sent a racially divisive tweet within minutes of the news 
breaking.42 In the minutes following the Westminster terrorist 
attack, suspected fake social media accounts retweeted fake 
news about a woman in a headscarf apparently walking past 
and ignoring a victim. This was retweeted thousands of times by 
far-right Twitter accounts with the hashtag ‘#BanIslam’. All four 
terror attacks in the UK in 2017 saw an online response from 
these Russian fake accounts, with close to 500 original messages 
being retweeted over 150,000 times.43 A key tactic used by 
these accounts was to attempt to engage celebrity and far-right 
accounts, thereby increasing the profile of their messages if a 
response was made. 
 
The additional challenge created by these fake accounts is that they 
are unlikely to be susceptible to counter-speech and traditional 
policing responses. It therefore falls upon social media companies 
to detect and remove such accounts as early as possible in order to 
stem the production and spread of divisive and hateful content. 
High-profile targets of online hate
There has been a recent trend of high-profile personalities 
being targeted with hateful and threatening social media posts. 
Examples include Gina Miller, Diane Abbott MP, Luciana Berger 
MP, Stella Creasy MP, Anna Soubry MP and Nicky Morgan 
MP, all of whom received threatening Twitter posts, some using 
hate speech targeting the race, religion, or gender of the victims. 
Many of the online attacks followed events, such as the key 
moments in the Brexit process. In the case of Anna Soubry and 
Nicky Morgan, multiple threats were received following the 
publication of the “The Brexit Mutineers” front page of the 
Daily Telegraph. Several accounts, including those thought to 
be fake and linked to countries outside of Europe, retweeted the 
headline and engaged in abusing the MPs. 
Research conducted on Twitter based abuse relating to political 
issues (i.e. not personal characteristics) between 2015-2019 
found prominent MPs, and in particular male Conservative 
MPs, were the most targeted, with Boris Johnson, Jeremy 
Hunt, David Cameron and George Osborne attracting the most 
abuse.  The topics driving the abuse included Brexit, the NHS 
and terrorism.  Abuse directed towards female MPs, while less 
frequent, was more likely to use of the “f” word and compare 
victims to “dirt”.44
Nicky Morgan has cited online abuse as one of the reasons 
she is not standing at the General Election in December 2019, 
a factor also mentioned by Heidi Allen, who is also standing 
down as an MP. There are widespread concerns that many of 
the other female MPs who are not going for re-election have 
decided not to do so due to the abuse they have received.
Diane Abbott, the shadow Home Secretary, came under a 
relentless campaign of racist and sexist abuse in the weeks 
before the 2017 General Election. The abuse directed at her 
amounted to 10 times as much as was received by any other 
MP, according to a study by Amnesty International (2017). 
Luciana Berger was targeted multiple times with anti-Semitic 
hate speech, notably by Garron Helm in 2014, and Joshua 
Bonehill-Paine in 2016. Both received custodial sentences 
for their Twitter posts. In the former case, the incarceration 
of Helm resulted in a campaign of hate against the MP, with 
coordination linked back to the Neo-Nazi Stormfront Website. 
 
The Committee on Standards in Public Life (2017) report 
'Intimidation in Public Life' found that social media was a significant 
factor in amplifying intimidating behaviour towards those serving 
in public office in recent years, with women, Black and Minority 
Ethnic, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender and other minority 
parliamentary candidates being disproportionally targeted. 
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During the course of research we undertook at MdR Cyber 
we focused on the hate that MPs face day to day. We reviewed 
whether this hate was replicated online.  
 — At present much of this hate speech is directed at a small 
number of users. This is not to say it is not prevalent, but that 
for MPs it is sometimes drowned out by political influence 
campaigns. We worked with Astroscreen, who specialise in 
social media disinformation detection and who are a member 
of the MDR Lab incubator.  
 — Astroscreen and MDR Cyber took a sample of the 1.6 million 
tweets, and downloaded all the additional information that 
Twitter provides. We also collected 400 of the tweets of each 
of the users in the dataset (260 thousand). In the process, we 
ended up with a dataset of around 65 million tweets.  
 — We found that a selection of users were being used to 
amplify a variety of hashtags, often containing specific political 
content. If used for hate or for counterspeech these could be a 
powerful tools.  
 — We found a small selection of users generate a large amount 
of the tweets to MPs. Many of these are accounts set up for a 
single issue. 
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International Instruments and Initiatives 
Cross-border attempts to tackle hate speech date back to at 
least 1965, when the United Nations adopted the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, partly in response to apartheid and post-war 
anti-Semitism. That has since been supplemented – in 2013 – by 
a UN General Recommendation on Combating Racist Hate 
Speech, which asks participating states to criminalise behaviours 
including the dissemination of ideas "based on" racial or ethnic 
superiority or hatred; incitement offences; and participation in 
groups that promote and incite racial discrimination. In 2019, 
the UN launched a Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, 
with the aim of enhancing its efforts to address the root causes 
and drivers of hate speech, and enabling effective UN responses 
to the impacts on society. These instruments have moral force but 
limited direct impact; individual nations can still choose how and 
to what extent to implement broad calls for change. 
The European Union has also headed several initiatives targeting 
hatred, and specifically online hatred, including in 2003 the 
Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime, and in 2008 the Council Framework Decision on 
using criminal law to combat certain forms and expressions of 
racism and xenophobia. 
Most recently, in 2016, the EU introduced a voluntary code 
of conduct aimed at faster response times to illegal online 
hate speech, which has now been accepted by nine major web 
companies, including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube. 
The companies have committed to reviewing the majority of 
content removal requests within 24 hours, then removing content 
as necessary. According to the latest monitoring report (February 
2019), 89% of notifications by participating NGOs and public 
bodies are now assessed within 24 hours (up from 40% in 2016), 
and removals of hate speech have increased to 72% from 28% 
in 2016. This suggests the companies have strengthened their 
reporting systems, and reflects the fact they have devoted more 
staff and resources to content management. 
The results of the code of conduct monitoring feed into the 
European Commission's wider work on tackling illegal content 
online, notably its plans to unveil a comprehensive Digital 
Services Act at the end of 2020, which will force tech giants to 
remove illegal content (including hate speech) or face fines. The 
Act will make social media companies subject to mandatory 
“notice and take down” orders - including in relation to certain 
types of racist and xenophobic content - and may involve 
setting up a centralised EU regulator. It will replace the existing 
20-year-old e-Commerce Directive but apparently retain the "safe 
harbour" provision, which exempts online companies from direct 
legal responsibility for user-uploaded material.
 
Overview of UK Domestic Law
— Criminal Law
In the UK, there is no single piece of 'hate crime' legislation; the 
terms 'hate crime' and 'hate speech' are not even legally defined. 
In fact, the broad umbrella of 'hate crime' encompasses numerous, 
specific offences across multiple statutes, involving hostility aimed 
at one of the "protected characteristics", including race, religion 
and sexual orientation. The law also provides for harsher sentences 
where any criminal offence is aggravated by such hostility. 
Alongside the hostility-focused offences, there are specific legal 
protections against stirring up or inciting hatred. Hatred in the 
legal sense is more serious than hostility and must be targeted 
at a whole group, in such a way as to affect public order. As the 
CPS Guidance makes clear, the incitement offences that have been 
successfully prosecuted go "well beyond" voicing an opinion or 
causing offence.
The other key offences relating to what is commonly referred to as 
'hate speech' are the communications offences, covering messages 
– including on social media – that are grossly offensive, indecent, 
obscene, menacing or false, as well as harassment, where the 
speech crosses the line into the unacceptable.
Finally, where the behaviour in question takes the form of speech, 
there are specific considerations bearing in mind the high threshold 
necessary to protect freedom of expression. Speech that crosses the 
threshold will be more than shocking or distasteful, and incitement 
offences in particular are highly sensitive, requiring the consent of 
the Attorney General in order to bring charges. Nonetheless, as 
the CPS also recognises, it views all hate crime seriously, given the 
potentially profound and lasting impact on individual victims.
3736 HATRED BEHIND THE SCREENSHATE SPEECH –THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Case studies
Several online hate speech cases have been brought before the 
courts that involve social media. The case studies below show  
that in some cases it is clear where a prosecution is necessary, 
while in others it may not be in the public interest to proceed with 
a prosecution.
Caroline Criado-Perez 
In 2013, feminist campaigner and journalist, Caroline Criado-Perez 
began a petition to replace the planned image of Winston Churchill 
on the new £10 note, with a female figure. The campaign was a 
success, and the Bank of England announced than an image of Jane 
Austen would appear on the new note to be issued in 2017. In 
response to this announcement, Criado-Perez was subject to hateful 
comments and threats of sexual violence on social media. John 
Nimmo and Isabella Sorley sent death and rape threats that caused 
Criado-Perez to install a panic button in her home. Both pleaded 
guilty to sending menacing tweets, admitting they were among the 
users of 86 separate Twitter accounts from which Criado-Perez 
had received abusive messages. Before passing sentence, the judge 
highlighted the extreme nature of the threats and the harm caused to 
the victim. Isabella Sorley was jailed for 12 weeks and co-defendant 
John Nimmo was jailed for 8 weeks for threatening behaviour.
In 2017 Nimmo was sentenced to two years and three months in 
prison for sending threatening and racist emails to MP Luciana Berger. 
One featured a picture of a knife and the text “You are going to get it 
like Jo Cox”. Another called Berger “Jewish scum” and was signed off 
“your friend the Nazi”. For his offences that were racially aggravated, 
sentences were uplifted by 50 percent.
Fabrice Muamba
In 2012, Swansea University student, Liam Stacey targeted Bolton 
Wanderers football player, Fabrice Muamba, with an offensive remark 
on social media following him suffering a heart attack on the pitch. 
While Stacey’s first post could be regarded as offensive, it was 
not directly racist: “LOL. Fuck Muamba. He’s dead!!!”. The offence 
caused other social media users to react in defence of Muamba. It 
was Stacey’s response to these users that took on a directly racist 
character. Several reports from the public were made to the police 
and Stacey was subsequently arrested. In court, before passing 
sentence, the judge highlighted the racist and aggravating nature of his 
posts, their reach amplified by social media and the news event, and 
the significant public outrage that resulted. Stacey was charged under 
Racially Aggravated Section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 and 
sentenced to serve 56 days in prison.
Dog trained to give Nazi salute
In 2018, UKIP member, Mark Meechan was found guilty under the 
Communications Act and fined £800 for posting grossly offensive 
material on YouTube after uploading a video of his girlfriend’s dog 
trained to give the Nazi salute to the commands “sieg heil” and 
“gas the Jews”. The video was viewed over three million times on 
the platform. In defending his actions, Meechan stated that he was 
only making a joke that was intended to annoy his girlfriend and to 
be consumed by those who subscribe to his YouTube channel. He 
apologised for causing offence. The sheriff of the court stated that 
the video not only showed the dog responding to a Nazi command 
and anti-Semitic speech, but also showed it watching a clip of a 
Nuremberg rally and flashing images of Hitler. By deliberately using 
the Holocaust as a theme for the video, Meechan was deemed 
to have caused gross offence that went beyond the limits of free 
speech. Meechan appealed the decision stating that the court’s 
acceptance of the context of the video was at odds with what he 
intended. His appeal was found to lack merit and was refused.
Tom Daley and Peter Waterfield
In 2012, Port Talbot football player, Daniel Thomas sent a 
homophobic offensive tweet referencing Olympic divers Tom Daley 
and Peter Waterfield: “if there is any consolation for finishing fourth 
at least daley and waterfield can go and bum eachother #teamHIV”. 
The tweet was not directly sent to Daley or Waterfield via the @
mention feature on Twitter, and hence was meant for a more general 
audience. Thomas was arrested and charged but not prosecuted. 
The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) decided, following 
consultation with Daley and Waterfield, that the tweet was not 
grossly offensive, was not intended to reach Daley and Waterfield, 
and was not part of a campaign. Therefore, the communication 
fell below the threshold for criminal prosecution. Thomas was also 
swift to remove the message and showed remorse for causing 
any offence. The DPP concluded that while merely offensive social 
media posts may not warrant criminal prosecution, they may attract 
alternative non-custodial sanctions, including those that can be 
administered by social media platforms. 
Jay Davidson
In August of 2018, Jay Davidson posted images on Instagram of 
himself topless holding a rifle with text urging people to “stand up” 
next to Nazi references such as “Heil”, “Aryan” and the phrase “fuck 
you racist Allah cunt”. The post was then shared on WhatsApp. A 
report was made to the police and Davidson was subsequently 
arrested at his home. He denied being a racist and claimed there 
was no malicious intent behind the post. In his defence he told 
police he was drunk at the time and admitted to having a drinking 
problem. When sober the next morning he claimed feeling disgusted 
with himself after realising what he had done. Davidson was found 
guilty of stirring up religious and racial hatred and sentenced to 4 
years in prison.  
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UK Civil Law
As in criminal law, the terms 'hate crime' and 'hate speech' do 
not exist in civil law. There are, however, civil remedies that are 
potentially available for hate speech (i.e. speech that amounts to 
hate crime), as well as for speech that does not reach the criminal 
(or at least the prosecutorial) threshold, which we might deem 
'hateful speech'. These remedies might be pursued alongside or 
instead of criminal action, for example where an online post is 
defamatory, amounts to a breach of privacy or data protection 
laws, or constitutes harassment (a civil as well as a criminal 
offence). 
However, much hate or hateful speech is not targeted at specific 
individuals and therefore not actionable; there needs to be an 
identifiable claimant or group of claimants, and provable loss 
or damage. More broadly, as with criminal hate speech but even 
more so in the civil sphere, arguments as to what is and is not 
acceptable, bearing in mind freedom of speech, are never easy. 
Another key issue is that hate speech often spreads via social 
media and other internet “intermediaries” such as Facebook or 
Twitter, which are largely shielded from liability as “platforms 
not publishers”. They have been positively encouraged to operate 
a passive "notice and takedown" model, not least as the result 
of various exemptions – including for those “merely hosting” 
content - afforded by the EU E-Commerce Directive. But, this and 
other relevant EU legislation may cease to apply post-Brexit, and 
in the meantime (see below), the Government is exploring ways of 
shifting more legal liability onto internet platforms.
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Counter-Speech 
Counter-speech is any direct or general response to hateful or 
harmful speech which seeks to undermine it. Influential speakers 
can favourably influence discourse through counter speech by 
having a positive effect on the speaker, convincing him or her 
to stop propagating hate speech or by having an impact on the 
audience – either by communicating norms that make hate speech 
socially unacceptable or by ‘inoculating’ the audience against the 
speech so they are less easily influenced by it.
 
All of the studies that examined hate speech production around 
‘trigger’ events cited earlier in this report also found the presence 
of counter-speech. Counter-speech is a common response to 
online hate speech. It can have a positive effect by stemming 
the propagation of hate and, when involving groups of people, 
reinforces norms of acceptable behaviour.45 Combating hate speech 
with counter-speech has some advantages over law enforcement 
sanctions: i) it can be rapid, ii) it can be adaptable to the situation; 
and iii) it can be employed by any Internet user.
A descriptive examination of counter-speech public pages on 
Facebook found they were less numerous and active than their 
counterpart right-wing public pages. The counter-speech most 
likely to be produced utilised parody and satire.46 To test if online 
counter conversations were useful in positively engaging with 
online right-wing extremists, researchers identified candidates 
on Facebook and engaged in outreach work. Measures of 
success included initial response rates, sustained engagement 
and indicators that the candidate was questioning their online 
behaviour. Results showed that 16% of candidates responded 
to the initial outreach contact, and that an argumentative tone 
produced the greatest success, followed by casual, meditative and 
reflexive tones. A scholarly tone yielded no response. Of these, 
64% engaged in sustained conversation, and 6% had subsequently 
questioned their online behaviour.47 
The Online Civil Courage Initiative (OCCI) was established in 
2016. OCCI is a collaboration between the International Centre 
for Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), the Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue (ISD), the Amadeu Antonio Foundation and 
Facebook.  Its aim is to combat extremism and hate speech on the 
internet through the promotion of good counter-speech on social 
media.  They draw expertise from technology, communications, 
marketing and academic sectors to educate and upskill civil society 
organisations in their counter-speech activities.  
The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) report "An 
imprecise science: Assessing interventions for the prevention, 
disengagement and de-radicalisation of left and right-wing 
extremists" (2019) found:
 — Online interventions include a broad array of approaches, 
including direct one-to- one outreach, one-to-many outreach, 
and organised campaigns.  
 — Unsolicited online interventions may be more effective when the 
practitioner is engaging with less radicalised individuals. 
 — Technical changes to a platform, or shifts in platform policy, have 
the potential to disrupt negatively the methods employed by a 
rangeof counterspeech practitioners.  
 — There is limited consensus on how to measure success in 
interventions due to a critical lack of systematic or independent 
impact evaluations.  
 — Intervention providers, and in particular those operating openly 
online, are not always fully aware of the extent of the potential 
risks to their own safety and wellbeing, or lack the resources or 
support required to mitigate these effectively.
Researchers at Cardiff University's HateLab are currently testing 
the effectiveness of different types of counter-speech sent to those 
posting hate speech on Twitter.48 Four forms of counter speech 
are being considered:
Attribution of Prejudice
e.g “Shame on #EDL racists for taking advantage of this situation”
Claims making and appeals to reason
e.g. “This has nothing to do with Islam, not all Muslims are terrorists!”
Request for information and evidence
e.g. “How does this have anything to do with the colour of someone’s 
skin??”
Insults
e.g. “There are some cowardly racists out there!”
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Initial results show that counter-speech is effective in stemming 
the length of hateful social media conversations when multiple 
unique counter-speech contributors engage with the hate speech 
producer. However, not all counter speech is productive, and 
evidence shows that individuals that publicly use insults against 
hate speech producers often inflame the situation, resulting in the 
production of further hate speech. When engaging in counter-
speech, or advising others on its use, the following principles 
should be followed to reduce the likelihood of the further 
production of hate speech:
Avoid using insulting or hateful speech
Make logical and consistent arguments
Request evidence if false or suspect claims are made
State that you will make a report to the police or third party if the hate 
speech continues and/or gets worse (e.g. becomes grossly offensive or 
includes threats)
Encourage others to also engage in counter-speech
If the account is likely fake or a bot, contact the social media company 
and ask it to be removed
While likely to be effective in some instances, general counter-
speech is unlikely to stem the production of hate in social 
media users that are associated with the extreme right (so-called 
incorrigible hate offenders). Those most susceptible to the 
stemming effects of counter-speech are those who use hate speech 
only occasionally (for example, around ‘trigger’ events), and 
those that are not on a pathway to radicalisation. Counter-speech 
is unlikely to be effective on some bots or fake accounts, given 
their control is either fully or partially automated by computer 
code and their designed purpose is to spread hate.
Operational Initiatives
Several initiatives related to online hate speech have already been 
announced by the Government and are operational. The National Online 
Hate Crime Hub (operating through the True Vision website: http://www.
report-it.org.uk/) was launched by the Home Secretary in 2017. The Hub 
acts a single point of contact through which all reports of online hate 
crime will be directed, acting in a similar way to Action Fraud, within the 
City of London Police. Trained officers provide guidance and specialist 
knowledge to police services and conduct preliminary investigations 
online. Police service jurisdictional issues are dealt with and, where a 
perpetrator can be identified, the relevant service is required to act on 
the investigation. The service improves victim experience of the criminal 
justice process that leads to more successful case building for prosecution. 
In addition to the Hub, the new UK Council for Internet Safety (UKCIS) 
has become responsible for online harms experienced by children, 
radicalisation and extremism, violence against women and girls, serious 
violence and hate crime and hate speech. 
What is on the horizon?
A new, independent internet regulator
In April 2019, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and 
Sport (DCMS) and Home Office published their joint White Paper 
on Online Harm, setting out an "ambitious vision for online 
safety" that goes "far beyond self-regulation". They proposed 
a new statutory duty of care for tech companies – defined as 
"companies that allow users to share or discover user-generated 
content or interact with each other online" - to be overseen by an 
independent regulator. The regulator will have a "suite of powers" 
to take action against companies that have breached their duty of 
care, including the power to issue "substantial" fines, to disrupt 
the business activities of non-compliant companies, and to impose 
liability on individual members of senior management. Companies 
will be required to fulfil their duty of care with reference to new 
codes of practice. Where these relate to illegal harms such as 
incitement of violence, the regulator will be expected to work with 
law enforcement to ensure the codes adequately keep pace with the 
threat. 
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Legislative reform
The Law Commission is currently reviewing hate crime 
legislation in England and Wales to test its adequacy and make 
recommendations for reform. It will consider whether hate 
crime laws should be extended to cover hostility based on age 
and gender - or other characteristics - and whether doing so 
would devalue the concept of hate crime. It will also consider 
the impact on reform of human rights obligations, notably rights 
to freedom of expression and against discrimination, likewise 
the implications for other areas of law, such as the Equality Act 
2010. After an extensive public consultation, to begin in 2020, 
the Final Report is due in early 2021.
Separately, the Law Commission has produced an initial Scoping 
Report on the criminal law relating to offensive and abusive 
online communications, with a view to conducting a second-
stage review. It noted that gender-based online hate crime, 
namely misogynistic abuse, is a particularly prevalent and 
damaging concern, and questioned whether the particular nature 
of hate speech is adequately captured in the current criminal 
law. It added that, where the majority of online hate speech is, 
in practice, prosecuted within the broader category of “grossly 
offensive” or “menacing” communications, the law should 
perhaps more explicitly address hateful communications, and 
label and criminalise them as such.
Conclusion
The growth of online hate speech is in many ways an example of 
the persistent online harms – including fake news, data capture 
and voter manipulation – that have prompted recent moves to 
regulate internet platforms as the key vehicles for those harms. 
Platforms are uniquely placed to remove unlawful content before it 
spreads, or even stop it being posted in the first place. Clearly, the 
major players have been slow to take responsibility for stemming 
hostility on their platforms, and must devote more resources to 
tackling the problem. 
Over and above these concerns, hate speech has its own 
complexities, not least the problem of definition. Currently, 
hate crime in the UK encompasses numerous offences involving 
"hostility" aimed at one of five "protected characteristics". 
The Law Commission is considering extending that range to 
include age and gender, possibly others, but recognises this could 
undermine the very concept of hate crime, as well as impacting the 
criminal justice system as a whole. Last year, the head of Scotland 
Yard, Cressida Dick, backed a call by the chairwoman of the 
National Police Chiefs Council to focus on "core policing" instead 
of misogyny. 
Meanwhile French MPs, who in July passed a law that will oblige 
social media networks to remove offending hate speech within 24 
hours (modelled on German legislation introduced last year), faced 
a similar challenge to agree what constitutes "obviously hateful" 
material, eventually excluding references to anti-Zionism and hate 
against the state of Israel. Twitter was also forced earlier this year 
to narrow its broad prohibition on "dehumanising" speech against 
"identifiable groups" to just religious groups. Barring the most 
serious incitement offences, working out when offensive language 
crosses the line from merely offensive to grossly offensive, or 
otherwise criminal, will never be easy.
This is not to excuse social media companies; regulation aside, 
they can and should do more. We agree with the Government's 
independent Commission on Countering Extremism that platforms 
need to be more consistent in how they apply their own terms 
and conditions, including as between far right groups and 
other extremists; they should permanently ban those who are 
persistently hateful or abusive; and they should be more open with 
the data they hold, to help identify new and emerging trends. 
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Against the backdrop of this ongoing struggle to decide if and 
how to punish hate speech, and how to assign liability, counter-
speech has emerged as a powerful tool that harnesses, rather than 
threatens, freedom of speech. Although it is unlikely to change the 
behaviour of true extremists, and has no impact on fake accounts 
or 'bots', counter-speech is a means of helping people to call out 
suspect claims, and to rally support from other moderate voices. 
That is especially vital when – in the rush to embrace to "de-
platforming" and "safe spaces" - we seem to be losing the art of 
reasoned debate. To quote Federal appeals court judge Barrington 
D. Parker after he ruled that President Trump was not entitled to 
block fellow Americans from following him on Twitter, "… the 
best response to disfavoured speech on matters of public concern is 
more speech, not less."
We are at the start of a long road to understanding the full 
nature and scale of online hate speech, and ultimately finding 
the most effective solutions. Where hate speech is both a cause 
and symptom of societal division, part of the answer is surely 
addressing wider social issues. You cannot properly tackle hate 
speech without tackling hate; if you do, you run a greater risk 
of cementing hostility and driving it underground. Another part 
is education, particularly of the young, including in how best to 
deploy counter-speech. Finally, we welcome the review of existing 
legislative powers, which should then inform any careful changes 
to the legal and regulatory framework. As society grapples with 
online harms, we aim to be part of refining its response. 
Methodological note:
Not all academic work on online hate speech has been included in 
this report. Decisions on what studies were included were based 
upon the established academic standards of rigour and significance. 
Several published studies were excluded due to issues with data 
quality (e.g. samples were not representative of the population under 
study, meaning estimates of victimisation prevalence were unreliable 
or the data presented were not collected in line with accepted ethical 
standards). Other studies were excluded as their findings simply 
corroborated existing work referenced in the report.
APPENDIX  
THE EXISTING LAW RELATING TO ONLINE HATE
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INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
United Nations International Convention
United Nations International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1968) and the 2013 a 
General Recommendation on Combating Racist Hate Speech 
(Recommendation No. 35, CERD 2013):
Recognises racist hate speech:
used by individuals or groups
in spoken, published, and electronic forms (e.g. social media). 
using hate symbols 
Acknowledges perpetrators may use indirect forms of racist 
language to disguise hate speech, especially when attempting  
to appear moderate to attract support for their viewpoint
The Recommendation states the following behaviours should  
be criminalised:
The spread of hateful ideas
Inciting others to hate 
Threatening others in the context of hate, or inciting others  
to do the same
Offensive hateful speech that is motivated by inciting others  
to hate
Membership of hate-related groups that incite hatred
 
Article 7 addresses the causes of hate and suggests many ways of 
stamping out hate speech at its core in schools, workplaces, law 
enforcement, the judiciary, and the public sector. 
Techniques for addressing online hate speech:
Legislation that governs the operation of social media and Internet 
providers within State jurisdictions, drawing on international 
standards 
Accountable social media and Internet providers that impress upon 
their users their responsibility for disseminating ideas and opinions
Adoption of professional ethics by social media and Internet 
providers that incorporate respect for the principles of the 
Convention and other fundamental human rights standards
Self-regulation and compliance with codes of ethics by social 
media and Internet providers, as underlined in the Durban 
Declaration, including:
Using Internet technology in the fight against racism, xenophobia 
and intolerance by promoting equality and non-discrimination
Rapid and coordinated international response to online hate 
speech.
‘Upon inspection of the UK’s 21st to 23rd periodic reports 
submitted to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, a recommendation was drawn related to the 
increase in online hate speech following the referendum on the 
UK’s future within the European Union. England, Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales, as well as the overseas territories 
and Crown dependencies should adopt “comprehensive 
measures to combat racist hate speech and xenophobic political 
discourse, including on the Internet, particularly with regard to 
the application of appropriate sanctions, and ensure that public 
officials not only refrain from such speech but also formally reject 
hate speech and condemn the hateful ideas expressed so as to 
promote a culture of tolerance and respect” (CERD 2016: 4).  
The UK Government are yet to respond this recommendation.’
 
Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA
2008 Framework Decision on combating certain forms and 
expressions of racism and xenophobia harmonises legislation 
throughout the European Union. In relation to online hate speech, 
the Framework Decision states member States shall criminalise:
Speech that incites racist or xenophobic hatred or violence made 
via information systems 
Speech that condones, denies or grossly trivialises crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and genocide that also incites hatred or 
violence made via information systems
The public distribution of pictures or other material via 
information systems in the commission of either of the above acts
‘National laws in many States remain inadequate, particularly 
in relation to speech that condones, denies or grossly trivialises 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide that also incites 
hatred or violence. England and Wales has no law criminalising 
this conduct, but prosecution may be brought if such speech 
is sent via email, social media or other online means and is 
considered grossly offensive or is of an indecent, obscene or 
menacing character.’
5150 HATRED BEHIND THE SCREENSAPPENDIX – EXISTING LAW
Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention  
on Cybercrime
2003 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime Additional 
Protocol Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and 
Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Systems sets 
out a comprehensive series of online activities that relate to online 
hate speech:
Distributing or making available racist and xenophobic material  
to the public through a computer system
Threats or insults that express hate towards race, colour,  
descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion sent via  
a computer system
Speech that condones, grossly minimises, or justifies genocide or 
crimes against humanity sent via a computer system
To date 44 States have signed the Protocol, with ratifications from 
31. The UK neither signed nor ratified the Protocol.
 
European Commission Initiatives
In 2016 the European Commission, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter 
and YouTube signed up to the code of conduct on countering 
illegal hate speech online49, with Instagram, Google+, Snapchat, 
Webedia and Dailymotion joining later. IT company signatories of 
the code agree to: 
Have rules or community guidelines banning the promotion 
of incitement to violence and hateful conduct and to introduce 
mechanisms, including dedicated teams, for the removal of illegal 
content within 24 hours of notification using relevant rules, 
guidelines and laws
Raise awareness with their users and staff about banned forms of 
hate speech
Streamline the notification process with EU members states and 
police services, to ensure timely and effective notifications of hate 
speech to be made
Facilitate the up-take of notification systems via partnerships with 
civil society organisations, who can become “trusted reporters” 
that can notify social media companies of cases of hate speech that 
contravene relevant laws, rules and community guidelines
Intensify relationships with civil society organisations to share best 
practice on countering hate narratives to assist in campaigns
Promote independent counter-hate-narratives, new ideas and 
initiatives and support educational programs that encourage 
critical thinking.
Intensify best practice sharing between social media companies
Evaluations on the progress made by Internet companies against 
the code of conduct have been conducted, and the most recent 
in 2018 shows 89% of companies reviewed the majority of 
notifications sent to them within 24 hours, and 72% of these posts 
were removed.50 In 2017, 81% of companies reviewed the majority 
of notifications sent to them within 24 hours, and 70% of these 
posts were removed. In 2016, when monitoring first began, 40% 
of companies reviewed the majority of notifications sent to them 
within 24 hours, and 28% of these posts were removed. In each 
round of monitoring all companies but Twitter have increased 
removal rates. In the 2017 round Twitter removed 46% of flagged 
posts compared to 44% in the 2018 round. For all companies, the 
UK removal rate in the 2018 round was 54% (a decrease on the 
66% in the 2017 round), compared to a rate of 88% in Germany 
in 2018 (a decrease on the 100% in the 2017 round). In the 2018 
round Xenophobia (including anti-migrant hatred) was the most 
commonly reported grounds of hate speech (17.0%) followed by 
sexual orientation (15.6%) and anti-Muslim hatred (13.0%).51 
In 2018, the European Commission published its recommendation 
on measures to effectively tackle illegal online content, including 
hate speech. The document outlines a set of common tools to 
ensure illegal content is swiftly detected, removed and prevented:
Detection and notification: points of contact should be established 
to facilitate detection and rapid take-down of content and 
investment should be made in algorithmic detection
Effective removal: illegal content should be removed as fast as 
possible, with fixed timeframes established for deeply harmful 
content. Transparency reports should be published detailing the 
number and types of notices received. Safeguards should also be 
introduced to reduce the risk of over-removal
Prevention of re-appearance: measures should be taken to dissuade 
users from repeatedly uploading illegal content. Algorithms should 
be developed to prevent re-appearance. 
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UK DOMESTIC LAW 
 
Criminal Law
Hate Crime
The term ‘hate crime’ can be used to describe a range of criminal 
behaviour carried out by one or more perpetrators, such as verbal 
abuse, intimidation, threats, harassment, assault and bullying, 
as well as damage to property. Although many people and 
organisations use the term 'hate crime', the legal definitions focus 
on the word 'hostility', not 'hate'. 
The law protects people against discrimination, prejudice and 
hostility directed towards disability, ethnicity, gender identity, 
nationality, race, religion or sexual orientation, where it is linked 
to criminal conduct. These are aspects of a person’s identity 
described in the law on equality as ‘protected characteristics’.
The following definition has been agreed between the Police 
and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) for identifying cases 
involving hostility based on protected characteristics:
‘Any criminal offence which is perceived by the victim or any 
other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice, based on 
a person’s disability or perceived disability; race or perceived race; 
or religion or perceived religion; or sexual orientation or perceived 
sexual orientation or a person who is transgender or perceived to 
be transgender.‘
This definition is used for flagging cases; for a conviction to receive 
enhanced sentencing in court, there needs to be sufficient evidence 
to prove the hostility element.
There is no legal definition of hostility, so the CPS uses the 
everyday understanding of the word, which includes ill-will, spite, 
contempt, prejudice, unfriendliness, antagonism, resentment and 
dislike.
In short, the law treats hostility as an aggravating feature when the 
hostility is:
linked to a criminal offence
in some way about one of the protected characteristics
The legal framework for hate crime prosecutions is provided  
by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA 1998) and the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003). These two Acts operate 
differently but deal with the issue of hostility in a similar way. 
Both Acts also provide for longer and more severe sentences when 
hostility is present.
Specific offences
The CDA 1998 contains a number of specific offences of racially 
and religiously aggravated crime based on the offences of 
wounding, assault, damage, stalking, harassment and threatening 
or abusive behaviour. To prove that such offences are racially or 
religiously aggravated, the prosecution has to prove the ‘basic’ 
offence, and the racial or religious aggravation, as defined in 
section 28 CDA 1998.
Aggravated offences 
The CJA 2003 gives the court power to enhance the sentence of 
any offence that is racially or religiously aggravated (section 145) 
or aggravated by reason of disability, sexual orientation or gender 
identity (section 146). 
The relevant provisions within the CJA 2003 and CDA 1998 use 
the same terminology in setting out aggravation:
at the time of committing the offence or immediately before or 
after doing so, the offender demonstrated towards the victim 
hostility based on the victim's membership (or presumed 
membership) of a (specified group(s)); or
the offence was motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards 
members of a (protected characteristic) based on their membership 
(or presumed membership) of that (specified groups(s)).
 
Case law guidance
Evidence of words (spoken or written) or actions that show 
hostility towards the victim will be required. "Demonstrations" of 
hostility often involve swear words, for example: "black bastard" 
(R v Woods [2002] EWHC 85) or "African bitch" (R v White 
[2001] EWCA Crim 216). In RG & LT v DPP [2004] EWHC 183 
May LJ said: "It may be possible to demonstrate racial hostility by, 
for instance, holding up a banner with racially offensive language 
on it." 
In R v Rogers (2007) 2 W.L.R. 280, the defendant was involved 
in an altercation with three Spanish women during the course of 
which he called them "bloody foreigners" and told them to "go 
back to your own country". The House of Lords, in upholding the 
defendant's conviction, held that the definition of a racial group 
clearly went beyond groups defined by their colour, race, or ethnic 
origin. It encompassed both nationality (including citizenship) and 
national origins. The House of Lords added that the fact that the 
offender's hostility was based on other factors in addition to racist 
hostility or xenophobia was irrelevant.
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The demonstration of hostility need not be based on any 
malevolence towards the group in question. Disposition at the 
time is irrelevant: see DPP v Green [2004] EWHC 1225 (Admin.) 
and R v Woods, in which it was irrelevant that the offender, who 
used racially abusive language to a doorman after being refused 
admission, might well have abused anyone standing in the victim's 
place by reference to any obvious physical characteristic.
The motivation based on hostility need not be the sole or main 
motivation for the offence; it may also be motivated by other 
reasons. In DPP v McFarlane [2002] EWHC 485 (Admin), the 
defendant shouted threatening and racist abuse at the victim after 
finding the victim parked in a disabled bay in which the defendant 
was entitled to park. It was immaterial that the defendant may 
have had an additional reason for uttering the racial words in 
question.
The victim's reaction to the hostility is not relevant. See R v 
Woods, in which the victim was called a "black bastard" but said 
in evidence that he was "not bothered" by such comments. The 
Administrative Court found that the use of racist abuse during 
the commission of the basic offence made out the test for racial 
aggravation.
How does 'hate speech' relate to hate crime?
Evidence of hostility might include words or actions at the time of 
the offence, or just before or after it happened.
Words might be abusive towards the personal characteristic 
or presumed personal characteristic, and action or behaviour 
might, for example, target something specific to the personal 
characteristic or presumed personal characteristic, such as a hijab, 
a yarmulke or a mobility aid. In some instances, the speech itself 
may amount to both a crime and the hostility element.
 
Stirring up hatred
Stirring up racial and religious hatred, and hatred based on sexual 
orientation, are offences under the Public Order Act 1986 (POA 
1986), but the legal elements are different:
Stirring up racial hatred is committed when someone says or 
does something (including posting material online, displaying a 
poster, performing a play or broadcasting on the media) which is 
threatening, abusive or insulting, and the person either intends to 
stir up racial hatred or makes it likely that racial hatred will be 
stirred up.
Stirring up religious hatred or hatred on the grounds of sexual 
orientation is committed if a person uses threatening words or 
behaviour or displays any threatening written material (including 
posting material online, displaying a poster, performing a play or 
broadcasting on the media), and intends to stir up religious hatred 
or hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation.
Note that the threshold is higher for the latter set of offences: 
"threatening words or behaviour" versus "threatening, abusive or 
insulting" for racial hatred, and a likelihood of stirring up hatred 
is not enough. Further, only the latter set of offences contain an 
express freedom of expression clause to balance the right to free 
speech (see the section on Article 10, below) with the duty of the 
state to protect the rights of others and to act proportionately 
in the interests of public safety to prevent disorder and crime 
(although Article 10 is relevant to all offences). By way of 
example:
section 29J POA 1986 provides that, as to stirring up religious 
hatred, nothing in the Act "... prohibits or restricts discussion, 
criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult, 
or abuse of particular religions, or the beliefs or practices of its 
adherents."
section 29JA provides that, as to stirring up hatred on the grounds 
of sexual orientation "for the avoidance of doubt, the discussion 
or criticism of sexual conduct or the urging of persons to refrain 
from or modify such conduct or practices shall not be taken of 
itself to be threatening".
Stirring up hatred means more than just causing hatred, and is not 
the same as stirring up tension. It must amount to hatred against 
a whole group – rather than hostility to just one person – and 
manifest itself in such a way that public order might be affected. 
The offences that have been successfully prosecuted go well 
beyond the voicing of an opinion or the causing of offence.
As CPS Guidance makes clear, "When considering whether or not 
to prosecute stirring up offences, there is a need to bear in mind 
that people have a right to freedom of speech. It is essential that in 
a free, democratic and tolerant society, people are able to exchange 
views, even when these may cause offence." The issues involved in 
such cases are highly sensitive and charges for stirring up hatred 
require the consent of the Attorney General in addition to the 
consent of the CPS.
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Communications offences
The Communications Act 2003 (CA 2003) applies only to 
messages sent via a public electronic communications network, 
and section 127 covers the sending of improper messages. Section 
127(1)(a) relates to a message that is grossly offensive or of an 
indecent, obscene or menacing character. Section 127(2) targets 
false messages and persistent misuse intended to cause annoyance, 
inconvenience or needless anxiety; and includes someone who 
persistently makes silent phone calls. 
If a message sent is grossly offensive, indecent, obscene, menacing 
or false, it is irrelevant whether it was received; the offence is one 
of sending.
The Malicious Communications Act 1988 (MA 1998), section 1, 
deals with the sending to another of any article which is indecent 
or grossly offensive, or which conveys a threat, or which is false, 
provided there is an intent to cause distress or anxiety to the 
recipient. The offence covers letters, writing of all descriptions, 
electronic communications, photographs and other images in a 
material form, tape recordings, films and video recordings. 
The offence is one of sending, delivering or transmitting, so there 
is no requirement for the article to reach the intended recipient.
Social media
Where social media is used to facilitate a substantive offence, such 
as a threat to kill or blackmail, prosecutors can proceed under 
that substantive offence; otherwise, one of the communications 
offences may be appropriate, and the CPS has produced specific 
guidance on cases involving social media communications.
 
Article 10
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
("ECHR") provides that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States 
from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises.
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection 
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure 
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
However, Article 17 (often referred to as the "abuse clause") 
provides that: 
“Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for 
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent 
than is provided for in the Convention.”
In other words, the right to freedom of expression under Article 
10 does not extend so far as to protect an attack – for example by 
way of hate speech – on others' rights under the ECHR.
According to CPS Guidance, prosecutors should only proceed with 
cases under s.1 MA 1998 or s.127 CA 2003 if they are satisfied 
that there is sufficient evidence that the communication in question 
is more than (i.e. crosses the high threshold necessary to protect 
freedom of expression, even unwelcome freedom of expression):
Offensive, shocking or disturbing; or
Satirical, iconoclastic or rude comment; or
The expression of unpopular or unfashionable opinion about 
serious or trivial matters, or banter or humour, even if distasteful 
to some or painful to those subjected to it; or
An uninhibited and ill thought out contribution to a casual 
conversation where participants expect a certain amount of 
repartee or “give and take”;
This is with reference to “contemporary standards… the standards 
of an open and just multi-racial society", assessing whether the 
particular message in its particular context is "beyond the pale 
of what is tolerable in society" adopting the observations, as 
guidance illuminating these terms, in DPP v Collins [2006] UKHL 
40 and Smith v ADVFN [2008] 1797 (QB).
Case law guidance
The test for "grossly offensive" was stated by the House of Lords 
in DPP v Collins to be whether the message would cause gross 
offence to those to whom it relates (in that case ethnic minorities), 
who need not be the recipients. The case also confirms that it is 
justifiable under ECHR Art 10(2) to prosecute somebody who 
5958 HATRED BEHIND THE SCREENSAPPENDIX – EXISTING LAW
has used the public telecommunications system to leave racist 
messages.
The European Commission has held that extreme racist speech 
is outside the protection of Article 10 because of its potential to 
undermine public order and the rights of the targeted minority: 
Kuhnen v Germany 56 RR 205. 
The ECtHR has confirmed that Holocaust denial or revision 
is removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17: see 
Lehideux and Isorni v France [2000] 30 EHRR 665; and M'Bala 
M'Bala v France (application no. 25239/13), which ruled that a 
blatant display of hatred and anti-semitism disguised as an artistic 
production (comic performance), even if satirical or provocative, 
was not protected by Article 10.
Prosecutors must be satisfied that a prosecution is required in 
the public interest and that, where Article 10 is engaged, on the 
facts and merits of the particular case it has convincingly been 
established that a prosecution is necessary and proportionate. 
Particular care must be taken where a prosecution is contemplated 
for the way in which a person has expressed themselves on social 
media.
Prosecutors therefore should, where relevant, have particular 
regard to:
The likelihood of re-offending. The spectrum ranges from a 
suspect making a one- off remark to a suspect engaged in a 
sustained campaign against a victim;
The suspect’s age or maturity. This may be highly relevant where 
a young or immature person has not fully appreciated what they 
wrote;
The circumstances of and the harm caused to the victim, including 
whether they were serving the public, whether this was part of 
a coordinated attack (“virtual mobbing”), whether they were 
targeted because they reported a separate criminal offence, 
whether they were contacted by a person convicted of a crime 
against them, their friends or family;
Whether the suspect has expressed genuine remorse;
Whether swift and effective action has been taken by the suspect 
and/or others for example, service providers, to remove the 
communication in question or otherwise block access to it;
Whether the communication was or was not intended for a wide 
audience, or whether that was an obvious consequence of sending 
the communication; particularly where the intended audience did 
not include the victim or target of the communication in question.
Whether the offence constitutes a hate crime (which may mean 
Article 10 is not engaged, but may also be a factor tending in 
favour of a prosecution in the public interest).
Harassment
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 ("PHA") creates both 
criminal (section 2) and civil (section 3, see below) liability for 
pursuing a course of conduct that amounts to harassment, and 
which the person pursuing the course of conduct knows or ought 
to know amounts to harassment (section 1(1)). 
A course of conduct will amount to harassment if a reasonable 
person in possession of the same information as the person 
pursuing that course of conduct would think it amounted to or 
involved harassment (section 1(2)). References to harassing a 
person include alarming the person or causing the person distress 
(section 7(2)). A course of conduct requires conduct on at least 
two occasions (section 7(3)). 
"Conduct" includes speech (section 7(4)), and the PHA can cover 
harassment by publication, including online. 
It is a defence (section 3(1)) to show that the course of conduct:
• was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime; 
• was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply 
with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under 
any enactment; or 
• was, in the particular circumstances, reasonable. 
The Court of Appeal in R v N(Z) [2016] EWCA Crim 92 
approved the following summary (per Simon J in Dowson (and 
others) v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [2010] EWHC 
2612 (QB)) of what needs to be proved as a matter of law to 
found a claim in harassment:
There must be conduct which occurs on at least two occasions,
 
which is targeted at the claimant*,
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which is calculated in an objective sense to cause alarm or distress, 
and
which is objectively judged to be oppressive and unacceptable.
What is oppressive and unacceptable may depend on the social or 
working context in which the conduct occurs.
A line is to be drawn between conduct which is unattractive and 
unreasonable, and conduct which has been described in various 
ways: 'torment' of the victim, 'of an order which would sustain 
criminal liability'.
*Although, per Levi and another v Bates and others [2015] 
EWCA Civ 206, a harassment claim can also be brought by other 
persons who were foreseeably and directly harmed by the course 
of conduct. 
The gravity of misconduct must be sufficient to sustain criminal 
liability. Where the definitions of civil and criminal harassment 
are the same, no conduct can be civilly actionable unless it is also 
sufficiently serious to warrant a criminal sanction (Majrowski v 
Guy's and St Thomas NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34). Lord Nicholls 
explained:
"…courts will have in mind that irritations, annoyances, even a 
measure of upset, arise at times in everybody's day-to-day dealings 
with other people. Courts are well able to recognise the boundary 
between conduct which is unattractive, even unreasonable, and 
conduct which is oppressive and unacceptable. To cross the 
boundary from the regrettable to the unacceptable the gravity of 
the misconduct must be of an order which would sustain criminal 
liability under section 2."
Civil Law
There are a number of civil law offences that may apply to 
speech that meets the criminal standard, in addition to or instead 
of pursuing criminal action. Likewise, speech that falls short 
of that standard may still be actionable, or at least there may 
be grounds for formal complaint, including to the primary or 
secondary publisher (including platform) or regulator. However, 
as with criminal hate speech but even more so in the civil sphere, 
arguments as to what is and is not acceptable, bearing in mind 
freedom of speech, are never easy. 
As in criminal law, the terms 'hate crime' and 'hate speech' do 
not exist in civil law. There are however civil remedies that are 
potentially available for hate speech (i.e. speech that amounts to 
hate crime), as well as for speech that does not reach the criminal 
(or at least the prosecutorial) threshold, which we might deem 
'hateful speech'. 
In a civil (tort) claim, there must be a claimant or group of 
claimants who have suffered loss or damage. A claim cannot be 
brought, for example, by (or on behalf of) all black people or any 
one black person in relation to a defamatory comment made about 
all black people; there is no identifiable claimant. 
Much hate or hateful speech is not targeted at specific individuals 
and is therefore not actionable under civil law. But where, for 
example, abusive words about Chinese people are also targeted 
at a specific Chinese individual, the following civil offences may 
apply.
Harassment
The offence
As noted above, harassment is both a criminal and civil offence. 
The same defences apply to each. To recap, the PHA creates 
liability for pursuing a course of conduct that amounts to 
harassment, and which the person pursuing the course of conduct 
knows or ought to know amounts to harassment. In a civil claim, 
damages may cover any anxiety and/or financial loss caused by the 
harassment (section 3(2)).
The formulation of the civil offence is slightly different in that 
an "actual or apprehended" breach can be the subject of civil 
proceedings. It is therefore possible to bring a civil harassment 
claim where harassment is expected, but has not yet taken place. 
In these circumstances, a civil injunction may be ordered to  
protect a person who "is or may be a victim" of harassment, 
and breach of such injunction – without reasonable excuse – is a 
criminal offence.
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Harassment and hate speech
To reiterate, conduct can include speech, including online 
speech, and two or more instances of speech can constitute a 
course of conduct amounting to harassment. Where the speech 
is "oppressive and unacceptable", and has caused another 
person "alarm" or "distress", that person may have a claim in 
harassment, and may be awarded damages (including for anxiety) 
and an interim or final injunction. 
Where the gravity of misconduct must be sufficient to sustain 
criminal liability, in theory, a claimant can choose to make a civil 
and/or a criminal harassment complaint (possibly alongside, or 
instead of, action in respect of another criminal offence). 
Defamation
The Offence
A statement is defamatory if it:
• identifies the claimant (this is possible as part of a class, if the 
words complained of would reasonably be understood to refer 
to each member but, the wider the class, the less likely that any 
one individual could establish identification); 
• is published to a third party i.e. to at least one person other than 
the claimant; 
• lowers the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members 
of society/the public; and 
• has caused or is likely to cause serious harm (in the case of a 
company, serious financial loss) to the claimant's reputation. 
Any or all of the author, editor and publisher can be held liable 
for any defamatory/otherwise unlawful content. To date, most 
internet intermediaries (e.g. Facebook, Blogger), have argued that 
they are platforms not publishers, and therefore not liable, at least 
not until after they are made aware of problematic material posted 
by a user, at which point they may be liable for the continued 
publication of the material. 
Alongside defences relating to the means of publication and type 
of publisher, such as website operators, there are defences relating 
to the content complained of, including:
Truth (section 2 Defamation Act 2013): if a statement is 
substantially true, this is a complete defence to a defamation claim.
Honest opinion (section 3 Defamation Act 2013): This applies 
where (a) the statement complained of is a statement of opinion 
(as opposed to fact); (b) the statement indicates the basis of the 
opinion; and (c) an honest person could have held the opinion 
based on any true or privileged fact that existed at the time the 
statement was published. The defence is defeated if the claimant 
can show the defendant did not hold the opinion.
Public interest (section 4 Defamation Act 2013): This statutory 
defence is based on the old common law 'responsible journalism' 
defence. It protects statements on a matter of public interest, in 
circumstances where the publisher reasonably believed (at the 
time) that publishing the statement was in the public interest, 
taking into account all the circumstances.
The court will only in rare cases grant an interim defamation 
injunction (i.e. to restrain a defendant from publication pending 
trial), given the public interest in freedom of speech and the 
principle that damages are a sufficient remedy. 
Defamation and Hate Speech
The law of defamation relates to reputation, and to the 
particular reputation of a person or company, whereas hate 
speech is typically broader in its focus as well as abusive, as 
opposed to reputationally damaging. A statement such as "Kill 
all Christians", for example, does not affect the reputation of 
Christians, nor, as discussed above, would there be an identifiable 
claimant where the group is so large. 
One can however imagine scenarios in which hate or hateful 
speech would overlap with defamatory speech and/or constitute 
harassment e.g. "X is one of those nasty Muslim paedophiles 
[false, defamatory], he lives at Y address and we should set fire 
to his house and make his life a living hell [hate speech and/or 
harassment where there is a course of conduct]". 
Misuse of Private Information
The Offence
There is a specific tort of misuse of private information. The test is 
whether, in relation to any piece of information, the subject has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Factors to consider include (but 
are not limited to):
the nature of the information
the level of intrusion
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the extent of previous disclosures (i.e. the extent to which the 
information is already in the public domain)
the number of people who know the relevant information
the steps taken to preserve privacy 
The right to privacy protects not only the secrecy of private 
information (confidentiality), but also against intrusion. 
Disclosure of private information may be justified in the public 
interest. When determining whether there has been a misuse of 
private information, the Court will balance the claimant's right to 
a private life under Article 8 ECHR and the defendant's right to 
freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR.
The remedies available are damages and injunctive relief, including 
an interim injunction where private information is about to be 
disclosed. 
Misuse of private information and hate speech
It is not often that hate or hateful speech will include information 
that is private. In the example given above however, disclosing a 
person's address to the general public would likely constitute a 
breach of privacy. Disclosing a person's sexuality, in the context of 
homophobic abuse, would also likely give rise to a privacy claim.
Unlike in a defamation claim, the truth or falsity of a statement 
is not relevant. So, a claimant could seek an injunction to prevent 
the publication of (true) details of his affair, on the basis that those 
details are private and that publication would be intrusive. 
Regulatory and Quasi-legal Offences
Hate or hateful speech may also fall foul of specific regulations 
and standards, and give rise to a formal complaint on that basis.
Ofcom, for example, regulates TV and radio broadcasters licensed 
in the UK. It is able to impose fines, issue warnings, suspend 
and/or remove licences. The potentially relevant sections of its 
Broadcasting Code include:
Rule 2.1: "Generally accepted standards must be applied to the 
contents of television and radio services and BBC ODPS [BBC On 
Demand Programme Services] so as to provide adequate protection 
for members of the public from the inclusion in such services of 
harmful and/or offensive material."
Rule 2.3: "In applying generally accepted standards broadcasters 
must ensure that material which may cause offence is justified by 
the context [see specific definition of "context"]. Such material 
may include, but is not limited to, offensive language, violence, 
sex, sexual violence, humiliation, distress, violation of human 
dignity, discriminatory treatment or language (for example on the 
grounds of age, disability, gender reassignment, pregnancy and 
maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation, and 
marriage and civil partnership). Appropriate information should 
also be broadcast where it would assist in avoiding or minimising 
offence."
Rule 3.1: "Material likely to encourage or incite the commission of 
crime or to lead to disorder must not be included in television or 
radio services or BBC ODPS."
Under Rule 3.1, “material” may include but is not limited to: 
• content which directly or indirectly amounts to a call to criminal 
action or disorder; 
• material promoting or encouraging engagement in terrorism or 
other forms of criminal activity or disorder; and/or 
• hate speech which is likely to encourage criminal activity or lead 
to disorder.
Hate speech is defined as "all forms of expression which spread, 
incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance on the 
grounds of disability, ethnicity, gender, gender reassignment, 
nationality, race, religion, or sexual orientation".
Rule 3.2: "Material which contains hate speech must not be 
included in television and radio programmes or BBC ODPS except 
where it is justified by the context."
Broadcasters’ attention is drawn to sections 22 and 29F of the 
Public Order Act 1986, which sets out criminal offences arising 
from the broadcast of material stirring up hatred relating to race, 
religion, or sexual orientation.
As for the internet, there is no single or specific regulator. In the 
UK, we have a patchwork of statutory and non-governmental 
organisations that regulate behaviour associated with the internet, 
such as the Information Commissioner’s Office and the Advertising 
Standards Authority, as well as regulators of industry-specific 
content, such as the Financial Conduct Authority. Currently, 
internet intermediaries are likely to escape primary liability for 
unlawful content, not least as a result of various exemptions from 
liability for damages - such as the "hosting" exemption - afforded 
by the EU E-Commerce Directive 2000. But, post-Brexit, the 
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Directive may cease to apply, and the Government is exploring 
ways, notably via an independent internet regulator, of shifting 
more legal liability onto internet platforms. The EU also plans, 
by way of a wide-ranging Digital Services Act, to introduce a 
centralised regulator, with the power to fine tech companies that 
fail to remove illegal online content, including hate speech.
At the same time, the scope of existing EU regulation is widening. 
A revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) has 
been formally adopted by the European Parliament and Council 
and EU Member States have 21 months to transpose the new 
Directive into national legislation. Crucially, the revised directive 
has been extended to cover video-sharing platforms, such as 
Netflix, YouTube and Facebook, as well as standalone parts of 
newspapers' websites that feature audiovisual programmes or 
user-generated videos. The new Directive specifically states (Article 
6) that Member States "shall ensure by appropriate means that 
audiovisual media services provided by media service providers 
under their jurisdiction do not contain any incitement to hatred 
based on race, sex, religion or nationality". 
Again, Brexit creates some uncertainty. The Government has said 
recently that, if there is no deal, the AVMSD will no longer apply 
to the UK, in particular the country of origin principle, according 
to which AVMS providers are only subject to the jurisdiction of 
one EU country (the country of origin).
Finally, victims of hate or hateful speech should consider 
platforms' own rules and standards (see Section One).
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1. The data for 2018-19 were not made available in the Home Office 
Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2017/18, report. The following 
reason was provided: “In April 2015, it became mandatory for all 
forces to return quarterly information on the number of crimes 
flagged as being committed online (in full or in part). There are some 
large variations in the proportion of offences flagged by each force 
depending on crime type and there is anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that the flag is currently underused. Due to the ongoing development 
of the statistics and concerns around the quality of the data they have 
been badged as Experimental Statistics. The ‘Hate Crime, England and 
Wales, 2017/18’ bulletin included some exploratory analysis of the 
number of hate crimes that had been flagged as online. The analysis 
showed that only two per cent of hate crime offences had an online 
flag, which was likely to have been an underestimate and therefore 
any conclusions drawn from the data were done so with caution. Due 
to the uncertainty around the quality of the data, the analysis has not 
been repeated in this bulletin.” 
 
2. The CPS Hate Crime Report 2018-19 did not contain statistics on 
prosecutions for online hate crimes. 
 
3. HMICFRS (2018) found that despite the Home Office introducing 
a requirement for police forces to flag cyber-enabled hate crime 
offences, uptake on this practice has been patchy and inconsistent, 
resulting in unreliable data on prevalence.
4. Awan and Zempi 2017, Williams et al. 2019
5. Demos 2017a 
6. Preferences were made on a five-point scale. Percentages represent 
the top two (protection from harmful content) and bottom two 
(protection of freedom of speech) selections combined. The neutral 
selection represented 42% of respondents. 
7. Greenawalt 1989 
8. Parekh 2012
9. Leets 2002
 
10. Ibid.
11. Crowley 2013 
12. Awan and Zempi 2017
13. Williams, et al. 2019
14. Galop 2017 
15. UK Safer Internet Centre (2016) Creating a better internet for all: 
Young people’s experiences of online empowerment + online hate, 
London: UK Safer Internet Centre.  
16. Keipi, T., Räsänen, P., Oksanen, A., Näsi, M., & Hawdon, J. (2018). 
Exposure to online hate material and subjective wellbeing: A 
comparative study of American and Finnish youth. Online Information 
Review, 42(1), 2–15. 
 
17. Galop 2017
18. Williams 2006, Brown 2018 
19. Butler 1997
20. Silver et al. 1986, Klein 1991 
21. Awan and Zempi 2017
 
22. Muller and Schwarz 2017, 2018, Williams et al. 2019
 
23. CPS 2018
24. Oliveres 2018
25. HMICFRS 2018
26. CST 2019. 
27. Tell MAMA 2018
28. Bachmann and Gooch 2017
29. Hawdon et al. 2017. 
30. Kaakinen 2018a
31. Kaakinen et al. 2018b
32. UK Safer Internet Centre 2016
33. Williams and Burnap 2016
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FOOTNOTES
7170 HATRED BEHIND THE SCREENS
35. In the psychology literature, this phenomenon is commonly 
referred to as deindividuation.
36. Williams & Burnap 2016
37. Represents both moderate and extreme anti-Muslim hate speech 
combined, and original tweets and retweets combined. Thanks go to 
my research associate, Sefa Ozalp for this graph. 
38. Similar patterns were found around the Brussels, Orlando, Nice, 
Normandy, Berlin and Quebec attacks (Demos 2017b)  
 
39. Williams and Burnap 2016, 2018
40. Demos 2017b
41. Williams and Burnap 2016, 2018
42. Crest 2017
43. Crest 2017
44. Greenwood, M.A. et al. (2019) Online Abuse of UK MPs from 
2015 to 2019. Working paper.  University of Sheffield. 
 
45. This does not apply to counter-narratives used in an attempt 
to de-radicalise those engaging in extremist Islamic discourse or 
terrorism (see Carthy et al. 2017)
46. Demos 2015 
 
47. ISD 2018
48. Williams & Burnap 2017
49. https://edri.org/files/privatisedenf/
euhatespeechcodeofconduct_20160531.pdf
50. The 2018 figures include Google and Instagram that joined in 
2018.
51. For a full breakdown see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/
code_of_conduct_factsheet_7_web.pdf  
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